ROUSSEAU AND SPINOZA T H E I R POLITICAL THEORIES AND T H E I R CONCEPTION O F ETHICAL FREEDOM
"There is no secular work in all the history of mankind which has stirred society to its depths so vehemently as did the Contrat Social." These words of a famous jurist1 would certainly be widely accepted by modern historians. I t must also be admitted that there is hardly another book which has aroused so much controversy. I t has been accused of inconsistency and considered incompatible with the other works of its a u t h~r .~ I t has been held to justify political issues as antagonistic as fire and water. During* the French revolution-as Charles E. Vaughan pointed out- Cf. the folloTing statements: LQon Duguit, Rousseau, K a n t et Hegel (Paris, 1918) , 6 : L'Rousseau est le pirre du despotisme jacobin, de la dictature chsarienne et & y regarder de prBs l'inspirateur des doctrines absolutistes de Kant et de Hegel"; and Alfred Cobban, Rousseau and the Moderfi State (London, 1934)) 6 : "Rousseau . . .is prinlarily a moralist, and being such . . . his end is always the individual and his liberty." John Morley, Rousseau (1886), 11, 132, calls the Contrat Social the gospel of the Jacobins and Bmile Faguet, Rousseau Penseur (283) : "le manuel de toutes les dQmocracies modernes." the vacillating and self-contradictory character of a book and its author ? Some authors find a certain development in Rousseau's political thought which reveals itself in the obvious differences between the two Discourses and some of his later political writings. As Vaughan says, "the earlier (sc. the Discourses) have commonly, and with some show of reason, been taken to plead for an extreme form of individualism. The Contrat Social and the 2cononzie Politique on the other hand subordinate the individual ruthlessly to the community at large. The former find the ultimate base of Right in the will of the individual; the latter, in that of the community in which the individual is merged."* Others think the change in Rousseau's political ideas shown even in the differences between the two versions of the Contrat Social itself. Whereas in the original draft the emphasis seems to lie upon safeguards against a tyranny from without, the later version seems to stress the idea that man needs to be made free, and that a certain constraint is unavoidable in order to achieve this aim. 5 Though some of these inconsistencies are undeniablehnd may be attributed at least in part to this development in Rousseau's mind, it seems upon closer investigation that some of these alleged contradictions are inherent in the very problem which Rousseau attacks in his political writings. Its core is the relation between liberty and subjection to the law. I n a certain sense this problem constitutes a real antinomy which does not admit of a definite and complete solution. On the other hand the problem is basic to the principles of democratic government, and Rousseau's approach to the question seems to indicate at least what the solution might be.
Rousseau's way of solving the dilemma which he occasionally characterizes7 as the task of assuring public liberty and govern-C. E. Vaughan, Rousseau's Political Writings, I, 4. Thus Charles William Hendel, Jean Jacques Rousseau Moralist, 11, 187 f. I n spite of the repeated attempts to prove the consistency of Rousseau's thought, like those by Gustave Lanson, L'unite' de la pense'e de Rousseau (Annales de la Soci6t6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. V I I I ) , RenB Hubert, Rousseau et I'Encyclope'die (Paris, 1928 ) and many others, there still remain many contradictions, especially so far as Rousseau's political theories are concerned, contradictions of which Rousseau himself mas well aware.
Oconomie politique, Oetcvres, 111,283. References are to the Hachette edition of Rousseau's complete works and to Gebhardt's Spinoza edition except where otherwise indicated. The Contrat Social is quoted by books and chapters, Spinoza's ment authority at the same time, was the doctrine of the social contract. His political theories seem so essentially connected with this conception that Rousseau has been considered the outstanding representative of the social contract theory. I n fact, Rousseau himself states explicitlys that the social contract offers the solution to what he calls the "fundamental problem, " viz. : "to find a form of association which with all common power defends and protects the person and the property of every associate, and by which every one, in uniting himself with all the others, does not obey any one else but himself and remains as free as before." I n propounding the theory of the social contract, however, Rousseau merely continued a doctrine which-as a modern interpreter puts itg-"he had inherited from the modern tradition in politics." What distinguished his version of the theory was that he had become more conscious of the fictitious character of this idea than any of his predecessors. To-day it is almost unanimously admitted that in introducing the doctrine of the social contract Rousseau did not intend to describe the temporal origin of the state. Fichte was among the first to realizelYhat the Contrat Social was not dealing with historical facts, and he pointed to the famous beginning of the first chapter. Since then more and more students of Rousseau have recognized that his version of the doctrine has nothing to do with a genetic theory." It is true that in his second Discourse Rousseau seems to picture the actual origin of civil society and even to accept the traditional theory of a real contract between the people and its chiefs.'' But even here he emphasizes that in deEthics by parts and propositions, the Tractatus Politicus by chapters and paragraphs.
Contrat Social, I, 6. Hendel, op. cit., 11,324. loJ. G. Fichte, Beitrage zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums iiber die scribing the establishment of civil society he is only following comnion opinion13 and that "further investigations would have to be made about the real nature of the fundamental contract of every government." He also stresses the point that the manner in which he pictures the origin of civil society and of law in his second Discourse seems to him the most natural, and only for this reason preferable to other hypotheses.14 I n the preface he states explicitly that his reflections are of a hypothetical nature and are meant to elucidate matters rather than to describe their real origin.15 This applies in the first place to the State of Nature, which in the second Discourse is offered as a hypothetical assumption and in the first draft of the Cogztrat Social divorced still further from the facts of history, so that in the words of a modern interpreter "it has become a mere blank, the purely logical negative of the civil state."lG I n Rousseau's chief political work the social contract theory itself is introduced in almost the same way, as a hypothetical or rather a fictitious assumption. He admits that there is not one among existing states which has been created in the way he describes; but, he adds, "I am in search of the Right and of reason, and I do not argue about facts.'"' l3Cf. Hendel, op. cit, 71 and Hubert, op. cit., 98 f., who shows that by "common opinion" Rousseau means the theories of the Encyclopedists. l4 Oeuvres, I, 115: "Telle fut ou dut &re l'origine de la societk et des lois . . ."
and 116: "Je sais que plusieurs ont donn6 d'autres origines aux sociQtBs politiques, comme les conqu6tes du plus puissant ou l'union des foibles; et le choix entre ces causes est indifferent & ce que je veux Btablir; cependant celle que je viens d'exposer me paroit la plus naturelle." l5Oezcvres, I, 83: "I1 ne faut pas prendre les recherches dans lesquelles on peut entrer sur ce sujet pour des vQritQs historiques, mais seulement pour des raisonnements hypothQtiques et conditionnels, plus propres SL Qclaircir la nature des choses qu'8 en montrer la veritable origine, et semblables 8 ceux que font tous les jours nos physiciens sur la formation du monde. .. ." F o r Rousseau's conception of the state of nature and the reason why he emphasizes the hypothetical character of the theory see below, note 60.
l7 Geneva draft of the Contrat Social, in Vaughan's edition of Rousseau's Political Writivbgs, I, 462 : "11 y a mille manihres de rassembler les hommes il n'y en a qu'uue de les unir. C'est pour cela que je ne donne dans cet ouvrage qu'une mQthode pour la formation des sociQtQs politiques quoique, dans la multitude d'aggregations qui existent actuellement sous ce nom, il n'y en ait peut-gtre pas deux qui aient BtQformQes de la m6me maniBre, et pas une qui l'ait QtQ selon celle que j'Qtablis.
Mais je cherche le droit et la raison et ne dispute pas des faits."
From this and other passages it seems that Rousseau makes a definite distinction between what is and what ought to be, and that in propounding the theory of the social contract he is more interested in establishing a criterion for the ideal state than in the historical origin of actual states. He occasionally blames Grotius for founding the Right upon facts.'' Thus when Grotius denies that every power has been established for the advantage of the governed, he may be right in the realm of facts, but it is as irrelevant from a normative point of view as it is impossible to justify the right of the rulers by the power of the master over his slaves. It is impossible to justify one fact by another fact.lg I n his resum6 of the Contrat Social in mile Rousseau makes a distinction between the "principes dzc droit politique" and the " d r o i t positif" of existing governments, and he thinks that for any just evaluation of existing governments it is necessary to combine the knowledge of both: it is necessary to know what ought to be in order to judge correctly what really is.'' I n a similar vein he says in one of his earlier writings that the fortuitous and arbitrary manner in which different states were actually founded could never be a competent criterion by which to judge the law of a state.'l It was in accordance with this distinction between reality and what ought to bez2 that Rousseau used the idea of the social contract, not as something that actually happened at a certain time and on a certain place, but rather as a "regulative ideav-to use Kant's expression. The social contract was the symbol and the l8 Contrat Social, I, 2 (Oeuvres, 111,307) : "Sa plus constante manikre de raisonner est dlQtablir toujours le droit par le fait. . . ." l9Geneva Draft, I, chap. 5, Vaughan, I, 470: "Quand Grotius nie que tout pouvoir soit Qtabli en faveur de ceux qui sont gouvernBs, il n'y a que trop raison dans le fait; mais c'est du droit qu'il est question. S a preuve unique est singulikre; il la tire du pouvoir d'un maitre sur son esclave, comme si l'on autorisait un fait par un fait. . . . I1 n'est pas question de ce qui est, mais de ce qui est convenable et juste; ni du pouvoir auquel on est force d10b8ir, rnais de celui qu'on est oblige de reconnaitre." Z 0 Dmile, V , Oeuvres, 11, 430: "Celui pourtant qui veut juger sainement des gouvernements tels qulils existent est oblige de les rQunir toutes deux (scil. Qtudes) : il faut savoir ce qui doit btre pour bien juger de ce qui est."
21Z!?co~~omie politique, Oeuvres, 111, 278. Cf. Projet de Constitutiom pour la Corse, Political W~i t i n g s , ed. Vaughan, 11, 311: "Quoique la forrne de Gouvernement que se donne un peuple soit plus souvent l'ouvrage du hasard et de la fortune que celui de son choix. . . ."
22 Rousseau distinguishes between "droit" and "fait," especially in ~r n i l e , V. criterion of a state in which every citizen is free. To Rousseau liberty is the supreme and ultimate goal of the state. The state was founded to secure liberty, and it can not exist without it.23 I n fact to Rousseau liberty is the summum b o n~m . '~ The words he wrote to Voltaire in 1750:" "J'adore la libert6; je dQteste Qgalement la domination et la servitude," are really the clue to his entire political work.
When the Contrat Social was published it was greeted by the citizens of Geneva as the "arsenal of liberty."'"
And it is true that as most modern interpreters would admit it was the conception of freedom, not that of the social contract, which was the core of Rousseau's work. But his idea of liberty had undoubtedly undergone certain changes. More and more he had come to realize that true liberty is different not only from license but also from the precarious "natural liberty" of the state of nature." True liberty is moral freedom-it is basically equivalent to ethical autonomy. Rousseau never doubted that the government and the laws of a state had a molding influence on the citizens." But at the same time he knew that laws and even constitutions are valueless if they are not in the hearts of nien." He was deeply convinced that in the last analysis any moral obligation has to emerge from a man's own will-has to be self-obligation. I t was this principle of autonomy which Rousseau transferred from the moral realm to 40 These remarks about the unhindered publication of Spinoza's books and about his journey to France are of course entirely incorrect. The latter story seems to go back to Gil Menage's posthumous book Menagiana (1693)' a collection of anecdotes and aphorisms which contains a fantastic report about a trip of Spinoza to Paris and his adventures there; the story was soon refuted both by Bayle, who called it "une fausset6 pitoiable," and by Colerus, who characterized these reports as inventions ("verdigtzels") .
Letter to the Comtesse de Boufflers, July 27, 1762, Gorrespondance Gdndrale, no. 1478, VIII, 43. disparaging tone of these remarks, however, is by no means surprising and must not be taken too seriously. Spinoza was considered an atheist, and his opinions were held extremely dangerous both to religion and to government. Most of the seventeenth-and eighteenth-century French writers who mentioned his name at all did so only with some more or less sincere words of disagreement, if not contempt. Even those who were in favour of Spinozism, like Bo~lainvilliers,~would not admit it openly or would disguise their agreement with his ideas behind an apparent attack.
There are two other references to Spinoza in Rousseau's writ--ings hitherto unnoticed by those interested in his relation to the earlier thinker, which seem to indicate a certain familiarity with Spinoza's philosophical doctrines. One is in a note in a manuscript of La ~zoz~velle He'loise omitted in the printed version of the novel. Rousseau here deals with the problem of immortality. He thinks it necessary that in order to preserve the identity of our personality in a future life we should be able to remember what we were in this life. lJTithout the consciousness of identity, and this means without memory, no identity would be possible. If a being does not remember that he is the same, he would no longer be the same. "Hence one sees, '' Rousseau continues, "that those who in following Spinoza hold that at the death of a person his soul is resolved in the great soul of the world, are saying nothing that makes sense. What they say is mere balderdash."" Though this statement by no means gives an accurate idea of Spinoza's conception of immortality, it really touches on one of the most peculiar features of Spinoza's doctrine. I n his Ethics:" when he is dealing with the problem of immortality, Spinoza expressly states that "the mind can imagine nothing nor recollect past things save while in the body." He thus excludes not only the possibility of any continuation of memory after death, but also as Rousseau correctly remarks any individual immortality. And though Spinoza does not use the concept of the world-soul he considers the human mind a modus of the infinite intellect of God, and seems to assume that part of this mind is eternal, insofar as there is an idea of it in God's intellect. It may be said therefore that Rousseau's remarks show a certain familiarity with Spinoza's metaphysics. This familiarity seems even more obvious in a passage in one of Rousseau's letters to the philosopher Dom Deschamps. I n this letter Rousseau answers Deschamps' request for an opinion about the preface to his still unpublished work. Rousseau says that Deschamps ' philosophic system seems incomprehensible to him ; but if he were to make clearer the confused idea which he has received of that system by comparing it to something well known, he would relate it to that of Spinoza." The ground of comparison de Spinoza, qu'8 la mort d'un homme, son bme se resout dans la grande bme du monde, ne disent rien qui ait du sens. 11s font un pur galimatias." seems to be that both systems start from "the highest of abstractions" and attempt to deduce the knowledge of the parts from that of the whole. And Rousseau adds that in his opinion the analytic method, though good in geometry, has no value in philosophy. Not only does Rousseau in this passage call the system of Spinoza something well known, but his characterization of Spinoza's methods may well be taken as sufficient evidence of his knowledge of Spinoza 's philo~ophy.'~ Besides these allusions and references to Spinoza in Rousseau's writings and letters we have a report of an oral remark which has to be taken into consideration. Antoine Sabatier de Castres in his book Apologie de Spinosa et due Spinosisme speaks of a conversation he had with Rousseau about Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and he quotes Rousseau as having said to him: "This is the one book among all modern works which has been most denounced by the priests, though it is just the one from which they might have drawn the greatest number of arguments in favour of C h r i~t i a n i t y . "~Ĩt is also interesting to note another statement which Sabatier makes in this connection. He says in parenthesis that Rousseau took almost everything he wrote about miracles in his Lettres de la Montagne from Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise.
Vouloir tout rQunir passe la force de n8tre entendement, c'est vouloir pousser le bateau dans lequel on est sans rien toucher au dehors. Nous jugeons par induction jusqu'h un certain point du tout par les parties; il semble au contraire que de la connoissance du tout vous voulez dQduire celle des parties : je ne con~ois rien 9. cela. La voye analytique est bonne en GQometrie, mais en philosophie il me semble qu'elle ne vaut rien, l'absurde o& elle msne par des faux principes ne s'y faisant point assez sentir." The last passage suggests that Rousseau mas referring to the "geometrical method" which Spinoza proposed to apply in his philosophic system. On the basis of these facts it may well be considered probable that Rousseau knew at least some of Spinoza's works. Spinoza was widely known in eighteenth-century France,48 and Rousseau's attention must have been drawn to his works by many circumstances. Diderot, for some time Rousseau's closest friend, was deeply influenced by S p i n~z a . "~ Moreover, Rousseau was familiar with Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium, which he had studied while at Annecy, and quotes repeatedly from the chapter on the State of Nature. I n this chapter Pufendorf deals explicitly with Spinoza's political doctrines, which he takes pains to refute. Vaughan thinks it more probable than not that Pufendorf's discussion of Spinoza induced Rousseau to procure and read Spinoza's
Theologico-Political Treatise to which Pufendorf refersa50
However this may be, there are affinities in the political ideas of both thinkers and even almost literal coincidences in the expression of those ideas which can hardly be considered accidental. This similarity is most striking in their ideas of the origin of civil society and of the relation between the individual and the state. Both accepted the theory of the social contract, as did most of the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Their conception of this contract, however, as well as of its function and meaning shows a certain affinity which makes one think that Rousseau must have been-directly or indirectly-influenced by Spinoza.
The motive which induced men to enter upon the contract wasin the opinion of both thinkers-the strong desire to put an end to the lawless conditions of the State of Nature. there is no law apart from the state." The natural right of the individual is null and void so long as he lives in the state of nature and has no possibility of protecting himself against others. "A real natural right belonging to the human race can hardly be conceived except where men have comnion rights, and combine to defend the possession of the lands they inhabit and cultivate, to protect themselves, to repel all violence, and to live according to the general will of all. 7'52 It is clear from some of his remarks that for Spinoza the state of nature, i.e., a life without any sort of government or civil organization, never existed.53 "Never could men have supported life and cultivated their minds without mutual help.' 754 It therefore seems that to Spinoza the state of nature is a mere abstraction assumed only to show the necessity of the civil state." We have to conceive it as without religion and law, and therefore without sin and wrong. However, any people who lived in that state of nature, i.e., barbarously and without political association, would lead a wretched and almost animal lif e.5"
There is a striking parallel between this conception of the state of nature-which, incidentally, is entirely different from that of Spinoza's contemporary, John Locke-and Rousseau's ideas. In Rousseau's opinion, before entering into civil association man must have been a dull and stupid animal who became an intelligent being and a man only through life in a civil state." Rousseau likewise attributes the passage to the civil state to the intolerable pressure of the miseries of the state of nature in its later phases." He draws a striking picture of these miseries in the second chapter of the first draft of his Contrat Social, entitled: " D e la socie'te' ge'ne'rale du genre humai.n." Here he refutes the false ideas of the happy life of a golden age of which the stupid men of primeval times would not have been capable ; he holds that under those circumstances human intelligence would never have developed. There is no natural law in the sense of a pre-civic law of humanity. In his second Discourse Rousseau even questions the existence of the state of nature itself.
He calls it a "state which does not exist, which perhaps never did exist and probably never will exist. " And Rousseau adds-indieating that the whole hypothesis has a practical aim-"and yet it is necessary to have the right idea of this state in order to judge correctly our present state."" It may be that one reason for Rousseau's apparent doubt of the historical truth of the state of nature-at least it would seem so from the Discours s z l r I'ine'galitiis that this would contradict the report of the Bible, which he considers as giving the true history of mankind." Nevertheless Rous- This brings us to the essence of the social contract itself. Vaughan has noted that to both thinkers the social contract represents an absolute surrender of the individuaL6' To Spinoza this surrender means that "henceforth all are controlled as it were by one mind. "" On the other hand it follows from Rousseau's conception of the social contract that by it each puts his person and his power under the supreme control of the "common will" (volonte' ge'.ize'rale)." There is undoubtedly a certain affinity between Spinoza 's "one mind" (melts zina) and Rousseau's "common will. '
The motive which induced men to conclude the contract- '65 in the opinion of both thinkers-was the endeavour to put a n end to the unbearable conditions of the state of nature. Entering into the contract was, a s Adolf lllenzel put it, psychologically necessary." As the motive was the same according to both theories, so was its purpose: all individuals wanted to unite their powers so that the entire power of all would be put a t the disposal of the commonwealth. Individuals gave up their power unconditionally that the power of the commonwealth should have no restrictions." A t the . . . orune suuru ius in ealn transtulerunt . . . se arbitrio summae potestatis absolute snbmiserunt. . . ." same time, however, Spinoza like Rousseau seeks to retain certain civil liberties for individuals, especially those of freedom of speech and freedom of conscience. I n Spinoza's opinion no one could transfer his rights and powers to others so completely that he himself would cease to be a man." This statement we find almost literally repeated by Rousseau in his polemics against Grotius." I n a chapter on "The Limits of the Supreme Power," he states that by the social contract each man ceded only that part of his power, his property and his liberty to the commonwealth the use of which would be important to the community.'O To both of them the democratic rdgime seems the one that departs least from the natural freedom of man. I n a democracy the equality and the freedom of the state of nature are retained, as Spinoza points out in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. He says there :71 "I believe it (viz., democracy) to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty. I n it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs; he only hands it over to the majority of a society whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they were in the state of nature, equals." This comes very close Oeuvres, 11,432, must be taken into consideration: "Que si done un esclave ne peut s'ali8ner sans reserve B son maltre, comment un peuple peut-il s'aliener sans reserve b son chef let si l'esclave reste juge de l'observation du contrat par son maltre, comment le peuple ne restera-t-il pas juge de l'observation du contrat par son chef?" I t may be worth mentioning that Spinoza makes a similar remark in Tract. Pol to the main problem of Rousseau's political theory. The question he proposes to answer or a t least to clarify in his Corztrat Social, is to find a form of government in which every individual in uniting with all the others remains as free as before and has to obey no one except h i m~e l f . '~ This is the very essence of the social contract: it is the principle by which both thinkers judge a state and its acts.
These are some of the main points of agreement between the political theories of Rousseau and Spinoza. The parallel between the political ideas of the two philosophers, however, cannot be thoroughly understood without entering into a discussion of the concept of ethical freedom as Spinoza and Rousseau apprehend it.
Herein lies their basic similarity, and it seems especially important to take up this problem since it has so f a r not been recognized a s the core of Rousseau's agreement with Spinoza.
The real meaning of freedom a s Spinoza understands it can best be explained in its application to God. According to Spinoza God may be called free because he exists and acts in accordance with the laws of his own n a t~r e . '~ There is no alteration in God's decisions ; it would be lack of freedom and imperfection could he alter his decision^.'^ There is no liberum arbitrium i~differerztiae in God. He acts with necessity, but a t the same time he acts with freedom; he is not compelled by anything to act in a certain way, but his acts follomr from the law of his own n a t~r e . '~ Thus it is in God that liberty and necessity coincide. Spinoza calls only that being "free" which exists and acts solely from the necessity of its own nature, and that being "compelled" which is determined by something else to exist and act in a determinate, limited way. Freedom, for Spinoza, is free n e~e s s i t y , '~ which is realized only in God. To man freedom means a n ethical goal or ideal. I n fact, this ethical freedom is one of the central conceptions in Spinoza This free man is f a r from being licentious, without bonds, or without law. The free man more than anyone else is grateful to others, always faithful and true. He would not deceive or act fraudulently, even in case he might save his life by de~eiving.'~ Thus the free man is necessarily the most social man.'" I t follows from this that free men, i.e., men in so f a r as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with another. "But in order that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain froni all actions which can injure their fellow-men."" This by no means interferes with freedoni in the ethical sense. J u s t the contrary is true. Though in the state nian gives up his unliniited power to act a t randoni, he acquires political liberty which is closely related to moral freedoni. Thus Spinoza conies to this conclusion: the nian who is guided by reason is niore free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in a solitude where he is i n d e~e n d e n t .~' The man who is led by reason, in order to live in greater freedoni desires to keep the common laws of the state.88
Rousseau's treatment of the problem of liberty agrees in certain iniportant points with Spinoza's ideas as outlined in this rather cursory survey. First, he also displays the Stoic viewpoint with regard to the passions, or ('appetites." One who allows himself to be led by his desires is in a state of servitude, not of liberty." Rous- 84 Eth., IV, 71; 72 and schol. The way Spinoza argues in this Scholion against one who might pretend that reasons of self-preservation suggest acting fraudulently, seems to anticipate Kant's proofs f o r the categorical imperative : "Si iam quaeratur : 'Quid si homo se perfidia a praesenti nlortis periculo posset liberare, an non ratio suum esse conservandi omnino suadet, ut perfidus sit ?' respondebitur eodem modo : (Quodsi ratio id suadeat, suadet ergo id omnibus hominibus, atque adeo ratio oinnino suadet hominibus, ne nisi dolo nlalo paciscantur, vires coniungere et iura habere communia, hoc est, ne revera iura habeant communia; quod est absurdum.'" This argument shows that uniting together and having common laws to Spinoza seem a n absolute or even logical necessity. 85 that alone makes man really master of him~elf.~" Furthermore, even in a political sense liberty must not be identified with independence. Independence and liberty rather exclude each other. There is no liberty without justice and justice means bonds.g1 I n fact the laws of liberty are more strict and severe than the hard yoke of tyranny. Liberty is something which weak souls who are the slaves of their passions should rather fear than desire.92 -For Rousseau, as well as for Spinoza, whoever follows the common will obeys only reason, and thus obeys himself.93 Therefore real freedom exists only in the State. I n the State, from the narrow-minded and stupid animal that he was before man becomes an intelligent being and a man. What he loses by entering the social contract is his natural liberty and the unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he might achieve, but what he gains is civil libertyg4 and the property right to everything he possesses. Man is more free under the social pact than he is in the state of nature." The laws make him free by teaching him to control himse1feg6
Like Spinoza Rousseau establishes a definite connection between g6 Op. cit., 446 : "I1 n'est pas vrai qu'il ne tire aucun profit des lois ; elles lui donnent le courage d'ctre juste, meme parnli les mQchans. I1 n'est pas vrai qu'elles ne l'ont pas rendu libre, elles lui ont appris B rQgner sur lui." moral freedom and political freedom. Both thinkers emphasize that obedience to the state does not interfere with real freedom," and that real freedom is possible only in the state. Rousseau goes even so far as to say that it is to the laws that man owes liberty and justice." There is no liberty without law; liberty always shares the fate of the laws ;it prevails with them and perishes with them."
It is the law that dictates to man the prerequisites of public reason and teaches him to act according to the principles of his own judgment and not to be at variance with himself.'00 Similarly, in Spinoza's opinion man lives in a state according to the common decrees of the commonwealth, and therefore a man who is guided by reason, in order to live with more freedom, desires to observe the common laws of the state. According to Rousseau men enjoy more freedom in the state because the individual in spite of his subjection does not lose any part of his freedom except that which may be painful to others.'" On the other hand, Spinoza also considers the man who is unfree, i.e., subject to his passions, to be at variance with himself.lo2 Finally just as Spinoza repeatedly declares the goal of the 97 Cf. Spinoza, Tract. Pheol. Pol., XVI, Opera, 111, 194: "His ergo providere summae tantum potestati incumbit, subditis autem, uti diximus, ejus mandata exsequi, nee aliud jus agnoscere, quam quod summa potestas jus esse declarat. A t forsan aliquis putabit, nos hac ratione subditos servos facere, quia putant servum esse eum, qui ex mandato agit, et liberum, qui animo suo morem gerit, quod quidem non absolute verum est; nam revera is, qui a sua voluptate ita trahitur, et nihil, quod sibi utile est, videre neque agere potest, maxime servus est, et solus ille liber, qui integro animo ex solo ductu rationis vivit." Cf. on the other hand Rousseau's remarks about the freedom of the slave mile, Oeuvres, 111, 26 lo2 Spinoza calls that man who is not free but subjected to the passive emotions "varius et inconstans" :Eth., IV, 33. state to be liberty,'" so Rousseau says that liberty and equality must be the real goal of every system of 1egislation.lo4
Even the details of the arguments of both philosophers show many points of agreement. As real, i.e., ethical freedom is by no means identical with lawlessness and has nothing to do with the liberum arbitrizm i~diferevztiae, but is itself based upon a certain kind of law, viz., the law of man's own rational nature, so political freedom in the state is based upon laws. It is this principle which is the backbone of the legal state. Both thinkers agree upor1 the theory that law in the real sense exists only in the state. I n this they differ from John Locke, who assumed that there is a natural law that binds all men, even in the state of nature. To Spinoza and Rousseau not only is law brought into being by the formation of the state, but with the abolition of the fundamental laws of the state the obligation of the individual as well as his freedom ceases to be.'" Furthermore both thinkers seem to imply that the laws of the state or of a "civil association" (associatiorz ciuile) enable the individual to achieve that ethical freedom which is not only in its very essence related to political liberty but also actually connected with it. For though both authors occasionally, in the spirit of the Stoics, assure us that even a slave in his chains may be free, both of them state at other times that the constitution and legislation of the state can contribute to some extent to the fuller development of human personality, and thus to the achievement of ethical freedom.lo6 There is another point of agreement in the general conception of the state. To Rousseau the real aim of what he calls the general will is the common good, which however can only be achieved where a state is controlled by laws. Rousseau goes so far as to consider only that state which places the law above individual wills (volorzte's particzdidres) in accordance with the funda- mental pact. He would call a Republic every state in which the law is supreme, and every legitimate state to him is rep~blican."~ Spinoza on the other hand thinks it appropriate to call that man a slave in a political sense who lives in a state in which the aim of the government is not the well-being of the individual but the advantage of the ruler, and he would call that man a citizen or a subject who belongs to a state in which the supreme law is the well-being of the people (salus populi), and not that of the ruler.'''
The very conception of ethical freedom and its philosophical foundation seen1 to be common to both thinkers. I n his Eynile Rousseau says that freedom means to resign oneself to necessity ; to let oneself be guided by necessity wherever it leads.log And Julie in her prayer declares that she wants everything that belongs to the order of nature. Rousseau warns us never to rebel against the hard law of necessity and to remain in the place nature has assigned to us in the chain of being."' From such utterances and especially from the famous sermon of the Savoyard Vicar in Emile we get the impression of a deep confidence in the order of nature which man must accept and to which he must adapt his own will. This comes very near to one of the fundamental principles of Spinoza's lo7 Contrat Social, 11, 3, 4, 6 et passim. ethics. Peace of mind can be achieved only by resigning oneself to one's fate, an attitude which follows from the understanding of the necessity and of the general laws of nature as a whole. Spinoza himself considers it an advantage of his doctrine that it teaches us in what manner "we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our own power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity as it follows from the essence of a triangle that the three angles are equal to two right angles." And he is convinced that "we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage" if we only remember "that we are a part of universal nature, and that we follow its order. '""
To Rousseau ethical liberty seems the highest form of freedom we know. The supreme end of all education for Rousseau-as a modern interpreter expresses it-is nothing but the complete realization of the idea of man and the fulfilment of human nature in its highest quality, moral freedom.l12 I n this freedom we find our happiness. For Rousseau too believes in the final happiness of the virtuous man: "Be just and you will be happy," he wrote to Voltaire. And though it may sometimes seem that Rousseau expects this beatitude to be reached only in a life to come, it is clear from other passages that he considers happiness inherent in virtue or justice and that moral freedom alone can bring the happiness of which man is in search. '13 This ethical freedom, once achieved, can never be entirely lost. I t would survive even in chains and within prison walls. We read in mile: "La libert6 n'est dans aucune forme de gouvernement, elle est dans le coeur de l'homme libre, il la porte partout avec lui.
L'homme vil porte partout la servitude. L'un serait esclave B Ethica, 11,49, schol.; IV, app., cap. 32. 112AndrC Oltramare, "Les idkes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau sur llQducation," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau jug6 p a r les Gefievois d'aujourd' hui (Geneva, 1878) : "La fin de 1'6ducation n'est rien moins que la realisation complete de llidBe de l'homme et l'accomplissement de la nature humaine dans ce qu'elle a de plus BlevC, la libert6 morale" (81). Genirve, et l'autre libre B Paris." More and more, however, we feel in some of Rousseau's letters a certain rather pessimistic note of resignation when he speaks of that sort of liberty which the virtuous man preserves in his heart even when his political liberty is endangered or lost.l14 And it sounds as if he despaired of the realization of political liberty when Rousseau in one of his later letters writes that there is no longer any liberty on earth except in the heart of a just man.'''
Nowhere does Spinoza strike such a pessimistic note. 122 Cf. Spinoza, Eth., IV, 7: "Affectus nec coerceri nec tolli potest, nisi per affectum contrarium et fortiorem affectu coercendo." Similarly Rousseau, gmile, I V : "On n'a de prise sur les passions que par les passions; c'est par leur empire qu'il faut combattre leur tyrannie."
The similarity of both doctrines has been noticed by Frasdorf, op. cit., 178, n. 1. However, the similarity goes deeper. Rousseau states occasionally that a passion may be purified and dissolved by reason. therefore the state by appealing to his egoism must induce man to keep those articles of the social contract which are at variance with his eg0is1n.'~~ I t is, however, in their idea of the predominant r81e which egoisni plays in human life that the agreement between both thinkers becomes most obvious. Rousseau emphasizes the original importance of self-love. He calls it the source, the origin and the basic principle of all the passions, the only one which is with man from birth and does not leave him as long as he lives.'" I n another passage he calls the law of self-preservation one of the two main principles of the law of nature,""nd occasionally he says it is the first ordinance of nature to care for one's own preservation.'" It is obvious how close these ideas come, even in their verbal expression, to Spinoza's doctrine of the "couzatz~s sese conservauzdi" or the l l co?zatzbs iuz s z~oesse persevera~zdi." For Spinoza the tendency to self-preservation is one of the basic principles which constitute man's nature. It is at the same time the first and only foundation of all virtue. It is true that in man as a reasonable being the instinct of self-preservation takes on a new and deeper form: for man self-preservation means preservation and perfection of reason and knowledge, as man's real essence is reason."' I t might be said that attempts to base human nature upon the instinct of self-preservation go back to certain thinkers of the Renaissance and were common with the French Encyclopedists. However, the way Rousseau and Spinoza apply this doctrine to their political theories is worth noting. According to Spinoza man is by nature subject to his passions and is therefore unsocial; it follows from this fact that a harlnonious life between men is possible only if each one gives up his natural unlimited right to everything and enters into a compact with his fellow-men not to hurt one another." ' The supreme motive for concluding this compact and at the same time the ultimate reason for its validity lies in the law of nature "that no one neglects anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope of gaining a greater good, or from a fear of a greater evil; nor does anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, or gaining a greater good.'' This law Spinoza considers so deeply implanted in the human mind that he thinks it might be counted among the eternal truths.'" Rousseau goes even further than Spinoza. Just because he considers man primarily egoistic he is searching for a motive which might induce the individual to subordinate himself to society and its laws out of self-interest. Rousseau thinks that without being compelled to do so, man would never keep those clauses of the social contract which are disadvantageous for him. The laws of the state are a yoke which everyone likes to impose upon others but which no one likes to accept himself. No one wants to further the common good unless it coincide with his This is what we would call a rather "realistic" approach on the part of both thinkers. It is true that it is in accordance with the interesting to note, however, that this realistic attitude is explicitly emphasized by Spinoza and Rousseau. I n his Ethics Spinoza proposes to regard human actions and desires exactly as if he were dealing with lines, planes and bodies ; in his Political Treatise he makes it a point to derive the reasons for the causes and natural bases of dominion from the general nature or position of mankind;I3' and he opposes those philosophers who bestow great praise on such human nature as is nowhere to be found, and who make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists. Siniilarly Rousseau in his political philosophy intends to take man as he really is, in order to investigate whether there might be a safe and just rule of administration in a state. Rousseau concludes his Discozcrs by saying that he tried to picture the origin and progress of inequality and the institution and abuse of governments, so far as these things might be deduced from man's nature by the mere light of reason. Rousseau was firmly convinced, as a modern writer puts it, that he represented the strictest scientific r e a 1 i~m . l~~ Yet both thinkers are f a r too idealistic to confine themselves to the facts of psychology and political science. Their concept of freedom is proof of this idealism. To both, as we have seen, real liberty is identical with self-determination, and this means to be guided by reason. Spinoza repeatedly states that those are rare who live according to the ordinances of reason,13" and yet he apparently considers ethical freedom the ultimate goal which mankind should strive to achieve. And the same holds true for Rousseau. Men are susceptible to passions, they are basically egoistic, and therefore unfree. The law of the state is therefore necessary to create liberty. Rousseau calls it the most sublime of all human institutions, an inspiration from heaven which teaches man to imitate here below the unchangeable ordinances of the Deity. Without laws the state is but a body without a soul. It exists, but it can not act.'" I n using this simile Rousseau seems to follow Spinoza almost literally. For Spinoza also calls the laws the soul of the state, the state being safe as long as the laws are kept.'" Men, however, can not live without common laws. And in a state the subjects are bound to obey the laws without question, even if they seem irrational ;but he adds that in a democracy such laws are less probable.
These ideas represent the core of the agreement between the two thinkers. For both of them law is the necessary condition for the achievement of the real purpose of the state: liberty. Thus in the last analysis the apparent inconsistency between Rousseau, the champion of liberty, and Rousseau, the advocate of state-authority, seems to disappear or to be at least explicable. It may be true that this inconsistency was, in part at least, a matter of inner development or of further experience. His earlier conviction that it would be enough to break the chains and to let the individual be his own judge, gave way to the new insight that the "volonte' de tous" is not always identical with the "volo+zte' ge'+ze'rale," and that in order to make the common interest prevail, it would be necessary to make man free or even to force him to be free. The word "libertas" on the prison gates and on the chains of the galley slaves in Genoa seems to Rousseau symbolic of the real meaning of liberty in a civil state.I3' But, as stated at the beginning of this paper, this inconsistency is really the result of an antinomy intrinsic to the problem of liberty itself. Liberty in a deeper sense can only be autonomy, and autonomy means to be a law to one's self. This, however, is exactly the position which Spinoza had taken a hundred years before Rousseau.
Rousseau is convinced that in order to make man free it is necessary to make him a citizen; and this means to change his nature, to substitute a partial and moral existence for his physical and independent existence; a partial existence because from now on he is only part of a whole.'" Rousseau has repeatedly emphasized how important the power of the state may be in shaping the indi- vidual. I n fact the citizen is what the state makes him.'" And yet even in the state the individual remains in a dilemma all his life: he is half man and half citizen. There is "a contradiction between our state and our desires, between our duties and our inclinations, between nature and social institutions, between man and citizen. "
I n the last analysis it is the conflict between the Spinozistic conception of ethical freedom, or freedom as autonomy, and the old idea of liberty as independence which lies at the bottom of this dilemma.'40 When Spinoza in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, cap. XVI, speaks of the freedom wherewith all men are born-he calls it "libertas rzatura1is"-or when Rousseau says at the beginning of chapter I of the Contrat Social that man is born free, they are both referring to the pre-civic state of natural independence. But Rousseau states explicitly that we must distinguish between natural liberty, which has for its limits only the forces of the individual, and civil liberty, which is limited by the general wi11.141
Liberty as independence can not be brought back, as man can not live without state organization. But it should be possible to reach a stage of development at which the individual would be a law to himself, and at which at the same time the general will or the law of the state would be nothing but the expression of these enlightened wills of individuals. Only then would the contrast between man and citizen disappear, and with it the sad necessity 130 Confessions, Oez~vres, VIII, 288 f. : "J'avais vu que tout tenoit radicalement 
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WALTER ECKSTEIN of forcing man to be free. It is this ideal state in which the general will would rule and in which therefore the power of the sovereign should be ~n1imited.l"~ Rousseau has, quite erroneously, been considered a forerunner of totalitarianism. On the contrary, he was strongly opposed, as he himself said in his famous letter to Mirabeau, to any so-called legal despotism, and Beaulavon seems to be right when he considers Rousseau's system to be in its essence not despotic but quite simply republican and truly liberal. The idea of the rule of law as the ultimate guarantee of liberty, an idea common to Spinoza and to Rousseau, is in reality the very backbone of the "legal state. " "A free citizen in a free state7'-in these words a modern interpreter has characterized Rousseau's political ideal; and he adds that the conception of moral freedom-a freedom which brings with it at least as much of self-sacrifice as of ease-amounts to nothing short of a revolution in political the~ry.'"~ We might very well say that in this conception of moral freedom Rousseau had a forerunner in Spinoza. And it is legitimate to assume that, directly or indirectly, Rousseau received his inspiration from Spinoza.
To Spinoza the life of freedom was a goal that can be achieved only rarely, and certainly only after hard struggle. But even the striving after it carries with it the highest beatitude, because it means the fulfilment of man's truest nature.'"" Different as Rous-
